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ABSTRACT
Organizational form, as an issue, has been the focus of attention since Weber’s
formulation of the ideal-type bureaucracy. For organizational scholars, the very concept of form
is at the heart of organization studies, such that “[w]here new organizational forms come from is
one of the central questions of organizational theory” (Rao, 1998: 912). The Weberian “ideal
type,” with its focus on the ontological possibility of identifying form, represents the inaugural
moment in organization theory. Since that moment, and based on the need to say what is
“organization” as the condition for having “organization theory,” it is a requirement of
organization theories that they address “knowledge about organization” based on a boundarymaking condition, no matter whether it is through contingencies, legitimization, evolution or
cost-reduction.
As such, much organizational theorizing views form as something already formed, as an
essence, with the attention focused on what constitutes form. Said differently, all that dominant
theoretical perspectives are able to do is to address form by way of classification, without
accounting for the process of forming, which does nothing but to reiterate that the only way to
think about form is through ontological reification privileging classifying schemes. By
problematizing the focus on “form” I take issue with the largely ahistorical and aprocessual
character of much organizational theorizing. With this as my point of departure, I argue for
knowing the organizational as an ongoing process – i.e., “forming” over knowing
“organizational form” by way of classification.
Considering the above, therefore, a number of questions arise: does history end once we
have classified?; does forming continue to happen once we have classified?; what about a way to
theorize forming?; how to understand forming over form? More broadly, “can we think any
other way” (Calás & Smircich, 2003: 49), such that we do not become enmeshed in, and
continue to reproduce, the problems we encounter when engaging with largely aprocessual and
ahistorical theoretical lenses? These questions lead me to the more processually and historically
sensitive lens of path dependence theory. Through the contributions of path dependence theory,
and with Ireland’s Industrial Development Authority as empirical example, my paper seeks to
address the concerns in the literature with regard to process, history and new ways of theorizing
and studying organizational form(ing), in so doing maintaining an opening toward organizational
forming in organizational theorizing and research.
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INTRODUCTION
In taking issue with the largely ahistorical and aprocessual character of much
organizational theorizing, this paper seeks to depart from knowing the organizational by way of
classification and move towards knowing the organizational as an ongoing process.

For

example, extant theoretical perspectives (such as structural contingency theory, transaction cost
theory, institutional theory, population ecology), which operate at the macro organizational level,
treat organizational form as an essence, as a durable, tangible and relatively undeniable structure,
which exists as an empirical entity. Taken as a given ‘out there’, each approach equates form
with, and classifies form as, a set of essential and identifiable characteristics that constitutes the
organizational, the particular mix of characteristics serving to distinguish one form from another.
Central to each approach, therefore, is the development of classification schemes and the
construction and maintenance of boundaries, not just to render forms distinct and identifiable,
but also to distinguish each theoretical view from the others.
Recognizing calls for more processual and historically informed organizational
theorizing, path dependence theory offers a way of articulating the organizational as an ongoing
dynamic over more dominant ways of thinking and knowing that are more static. With an
interest in how process, sequence and temporality can be best incorporated into explanation, path
dependence attempts to ‘strike a better balance between historically insensitive causal
generalization and idiographic historicism’ (Haydu, 1998: 367).
Re-inserting process and history into studying the organizational, through the lens of path
dependence, offers an approach to move out of some of the organizational literature’s current
limitations. In the sections that follow, I reflect on the position afforded history in the study of
the organizational, which brings me on to path dependence theory itself. Having outlined the
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tenets of the theory, I then move on to telling an organizational forming story, namely that of
Ireland’s Industrial Development Authority (see also Donnelly, 2007, forthcoming).
REINSERTING HISTORY INTO ‘THE ORGANIZATIONAL’
While there have been calls to develop more historically informed organizational theory,
in turn facilitating a more process oriented and more contingent/less deterministic approach, this
does not mean breaking with modernity, for mainstream modernist history is no less
foundational, rational, essentialist, logocentric or concerned with the notion of progress. With
faith in reason, the modernist historian’s unquestioned task has been to dig into the past, to
investigate it, to discover a past reality and reconstruct it scientifically, to find the ‘one line
running through history’ (Ankersmit, 1989: 153). Claiming authority for historical knowledge
(White, 1995), the goal has been ‘uniformization of the past’ through integration, synthesis and
totality (Ankersmit, 1989: 153).

Critiques of history in this fashion have, nonetheless,

increasingly appeared (e.g., Lukacs, 2002), including those such as Üsdiken and Kieser (2004)
who argue that use of history in organization studies are not all the same and can be demarcated
according to how history is treated in relation to the social scientistic perspective that has come
to dominate the field.
The Supplementarist Position
Theorizing within the supplementarist position ranges from the timeless to limiting the
value of history to add context for developing or testing generalizable theories (Kieser, 1994;
Üsdiken and Kieser, 2004; Zald, 1990, 1993). As a useful check for ideas (Goldman, 1994),
therefore, history becomes, substantively, an object of theoretical frames seeking to analyze and
explain past events (Lawrence, 1984) and/or methodologically, an object of theory development
and hypothesis generation (Goodman and Kruger, 1988). Claiming, for example, that
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organizational ecology and institutional theory already incorporate history into their analyses,
Goldman (1994: 623) goes on to assert that assimilating history into organization theory is only
possible if it is acknowledged that ‘insofar as theory refers to principles of organization that
transcend time and space, historical and comparative (that is international and/or multicultural)
data can test the generalisability and utility of a theory’.
With the exception of contingency theories, and their largely cross-sectional (in contrast
to longitudinal) research focus, other organizational theories – transaction cost, institutional and
ecological theories – each accommodate a historical take that could be considered
supplementarist (Clark and Rowlinson, 2004). However, such an accommodation is limited for,
as Baum (1996: 107) notes, ‘no theory can be general, precise, and realistic at the same time’.
Hence, with realism (and precision) as the trade-off for generality, history becomes subordinated
to contributing to the theory-driven scientistic enterprise substantively, i.e., through its potential
for confirming and refining general theories, and/or methodologically, i.e., as an aid in selecting
variables and in generating hypotheses within a theoretical context.
The Integrationist Position
In a criticism that can also be applied to mainstream organizational theory in general,
Kieser (1994: 612) notes that sociologists, in favoring grand theories that bother little with
historical details that disconfirm their theories, would be seen by many historians ‘as people who
state the obvious in an abstract jargon, lack any sense of differences in culture or time, squeeze
phenomena into rigid categories and, to top it all, declare these activities as “scientific”’. Given
the inferior position they accord history, Kieser (1994) calls for the abandonment of models that
are conceptualized separately from that which is to be explained, in favor of analyses that are
more interpretive and inductive, i.e., integrationist. For those of an integrationist position, the
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concern is with activating the potential of history to enrich organization studies through both
employing and challenging its social scientistic counterpart: ‘Ultimately, the issue is how do we
combine a positivistic programme of theoretical and empirical cumulation with the enriching
possibilities of the humanities’ (Zald, 1993: 516, emphasis in original). In similar vein, Kieser
(1994: 619) proffers that ‘[h]istorical analyses do not replace existing organization theory; they
enrich our understanding of present-day organizations by reconstructing the human acts which
created them in the course of history.’
Thus, an integrationist position recognizes that the organizational has been shaped by
past events and that its course of development has been influenced by the broader context. More
specifically, an integrationist position entails interest in ‘processes of organisational change,
development of organisational forms and variations across societal settings, path dependencies
and continuities in organisational ideas and practices’ (Üsdiken and Kieser, 2004: 323).
PATH DEPENDENCE AS INTEGRATIONIST POSITION
Recognizing calls for more processual and historically informed theorizing, path
dependence theory (Arthur, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1994; David, 1985, 1987, 1994, 1997, 1999,
2001) offers a way of articulating the institutional as an ongoing dynamic over more dominant
ways of thinking and knowing that are more static. With an interest in how process, sequence
and temporality can be best incorporated into explanation, path dependence attempts to “strike a
better balance between historically insensitive causal generalization and idiographic historicism”
(Haydu, 1998: 367).
Viewed as an idea through which “history” is commonly made visible, path dependence
refers to dynamic processes involving irreversibilities, which generate multiple possible
outcomes depending on the particular sequence in which events unfold. The path dependence
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approach holds that a historical path of choices has the character of a branching process with a
self-reinforcing dynamic in which positive feedback increases, while at the same time the costs
of reversing previous decisions increase, and the scope for reversing them narrows sequentially,
as the development proceeds. As noted by David (2001: 23), “the core content of the concept of
path dependence as a dynamic property refers to the idea of history as an irreversible branching
process.” Thus, preceding steps in a particular direction induce further movement in the same
direction, thereby making the possibility of switching to some other previously credible
alternative more difficult. “In an increasing returns process, the probability of further steps along
the same path increases with each move down that path. This is because the relative benefits of
the current activity compared with other possible options increase over time” (Pierson, 2000:
252, emphasis in original).
Those who are not familiar with the path dependence approach think that it is no more
than recognition that “history matters”. However, the approach not only recognizes the impact
of history, but also shows that a decision-making process can exhibit self-reinforcing dynamics,
such that an evolution over time to the most efficient alternative does not necessarily occur. In
general, path dependence refers to situations in which decision-making processes (partly) depend
on prior choices and events. It recognizes that a decision is not made in some historical and
institutional void just by looking at the characteristics and expected effects of the alternatives,
but also by taking into account how much each alternative deviates from current institutional
arrangements that have developed in time. An outcome thus depends on the contingent starting
point and specific course of a historical decision-making process.
From its roots in economics, path dependence has branched out to become a key concept
in studying institutional evolution over the past decade (Crouch & Farrell, 2002). North (1990)
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proposed transforming the approach in such a way that it could be applied in an institutional
context, noting that all the features identified in investigations of increasing returns in technology
can equally apply to institutions, although with somewhat different characteristics, and that
institutions are subject to considerable increasing returns.

In situations of complex social

interdependence, new institutions commonly require high fixed or start-up costs, and they entail
significant learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations.

By and large,

established institutions engender powerful incentives that buttress their own stability (David,
1994).
North (1990) stresses that positive feedback applies not just to single institutions, but that
institutional arrangements also produce corresponding organizational forms, which in turn may
induce the development of new complementary institutions.

Path-dependent processes will

frequently be most marked not at the level of discrete organizations or institutions, but at a more
macro level that comprises arrangements of corresponding organizations and institutions
(Pierson & Skocpol, 2002).
For social scientists interested in paths of development, the key issue is often what North
(1990: 95) calls “the interdependent web of an institutional matrix”, a matrix that “produces
massive increasing returns”. As North (1990: 3) sees it, institutions, broadly defined as “the
rules of the game in a society or, more formally, ... the humanly devised constraints that shape
human interaction”, account for the anomaly of enduring difference in economic performance.
Once in place, institutions are difficult to alter, and they have an enormous impact on the
potential for producing sustained economic growth.

Individuals and organizations become

accustomed to existing institutions and when institutions do not encourage economic
productivity, growth, if any, is unlikely.
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Social scientists, therefore, generally invoke the notion of path dependence to support a
few key claims (Pierson, 2004): specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; from initially
similar conditions, a wide array of social outcomes are often possible; large consequences may
result from relatively small or contingent events; particular courses of action, once introduced,
are almost impossible to reverse; and consequently, development is often punctuated by critical
moments or junctures which shape the basic contours of social life. All of these features contrast
sharply with more familiar modes of argument and explanation, which attribute large outcomes
to large causes and emphasize the prevalence of unique, predictable outcomes, the irrelevance of
timing and sequence, and the capacity of rational actors to design and implement optimal
solutions (given their resources and constraints) to the problems that confront them.
INCORPORATING HISTORY AND PROCESS
Through the concept of path dependence, there is now the possibility to move beyond
ahistorical and aprocessual organizational theorizing. In the opinion of Hirsch and Gillespie
(2001: 87), ‘Path dependence deserves credit for bringing history back into analysis […]
stimulating economists and other social scientists to address the limitations of their largely
ahistorical models.’

It seeks to assess how process, sequence and temporality can be best

incorporated into explanation, the focus of the researcher being on particular outcomes, temporal
sequencing and the unfolding of processes over time.
Accounts of how and why events develop as they do necessitate a mode of causal logic
that is grounded in time and in characteristically temporal processes (Abrams, 1982; Aminzade,
1992). As Mahoney (2000: 511) notes, path-dependent analyses have at least three defining
characteristics: (1) they entail the study of causal processes that are very sensitive to events that
occur early on in an overall historical sequence; (2) given the contingent character of these early

8

historical events, they cannot be explained by reason of preceding events or initial conditions;
and (3) when contingent historical events occur, path-dependent sequences are reflected in
essentially deterministic causal patterns. Mahoney (2001:112) elaborates these characteristics
into an analytic structure based on his view that path dependence refers ‘to a specific type of
explanation that unfolds through a series of sequential stages’, as shown in Figure 1.
Antecedent
conditions

Critical
juncture

Structural
persistence

Reactive
sequence

Outcome

Historical
factors that
define
available
options and
shape selection
processes

Selection of a
particular
option from
among many
alternatives

Production and
reproduction of
organizational
form

Reactions and
counterreactions to
organizational
form

Resolution of
conflict
generated by
reactions and
counterreactions

Figure 1 – Analytic structure of path-dependent explanation (adapted from Mahoney, 2001: 113).
In the course of pre-critical junctures, when antecedent conditions are at play, at least two
alternatives are open for selection and potential processes influencing the choice made at the
critical juncture become active. The choice is consequential because it leads to the creation of a
pattern that endures over time, nudging history down tracks that then, through the stubborn
persistence of subsequent continuities, become increasingly difficult to reverse. It is here that
positive feedback processes become active, with set-up or fixed costs (when high, individuals
and organizations have a strong incentive to stay on path), learning effects (experience of an
existing path leads to higher returns from continuing use), coordination effects (benefits of a
given path increase as others adopt the same option) and adaptive expectations (self-fulfilling
character of ‘picking the right horse’) (Arthur, 1994: 112), along with layering (Thelen, 2003),
coming into play and contributing to structural persistence. To these mechanisms can be added
those of veto points, or rules that make pre-existing arrangements hard to reverse, and asset
specificity (Pierson, 2004), the latter providing additional force to the mechanisms of
coordination effects and adaptive expectations. Thus it is that, once a specific selection has been
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made, it becomes increasingly difficult with the passing of time to return to the initial critical
juncture when at least two options were still available.

As noted by Arthur (1989, 1994),

increasing returns to adoption are realized not at a single point of time but rather dynamically,
such that each step along a particular path produces consequences that increase the relative
attractiveness of that path for the next round. As effects begin to accumulate, they generate a
powerful cycle of self-reinforcing activity, contributing to structural persistence, such that over
time it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to reverse direction.
The continued existence of an institution over time activates a sequence of causally
linked events that, when activated, materialize separately from the institutional factors that
originally produced it. In such reactive sequences, which comprise chains of events that are both
temporally ordered and causally connected, the final event in the sequence is the outcome of
interest. With each event within the chain a reaction to temporally antecedent events, and thus
dependent on prior events, the overall chain of events can be viewed as a path culminating in the
outcome. A reactive sequence is often set in motion by an initial challenge to the existing
institution, with counter-reactions to this opposition then driving ensuing events in the sequence.
Reactive sequences are normally marked by properties of reaction and counter-response as
institutional patterns put in place during critical juncture periods are resisted or supported.
Although such resistance may not lead to the transformation of these institutions, it can trigger an
independent process that includes events leading to a result of interest. The tensions of a reactive
sequence usually yield more stable final outcomes, which involve the development of new
institutional patterns. While such outcomes suggest fairly stable equilibrium points, they will
inevitably become displaced by new periods of discontinuity signaling the end of a particular
critical juncture and possibly the start of a new one.
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FORMING IRELAND’S INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Taking path dependence as lens, we now move on to trace the creation and
(re)production of Ireland’s Industrial Development Authority (IDA hereafter). The story that
unfolds takes as its starting point the country’s turn to protectionism following the general
election of 1932, charting the increasing investment by successive Governments in the
machinery of protection and the creation of the Authority in 1949 as an autonomous agency
within an institutional matrix focused on protection. The story then moves on to tell of the
gradual shift away from protection towards free trade, a repositioning that witnessed the
emergence of the Authority as the pre-eminent agency of state dealing with industrial
development and its re-creation as a state-sponsored organization. Throughout the course of
time, the story traces the growing commitment to the Authority in terms of political, institutional
and monetary resources, with the Authority in turn reinforcing that commitment through delivery
on its objectives, largely in the shape of new job creation. Essentially, the story is illustrative of
increasing returns reinforcing the chosen path of industrial development, itself reinforcing the
IDA as the principal instrument through which such development occurs. However, as the story
continues to unfold, the increasing reliance on foreign investment to meet targets, at the expense
of indigenous industry, eventually surfaces as a challenge to the Authority in the early 1980s and
culminates in the Authority being split into separate agencies in 1994.
Emerging within Protectionism: Creating the IDA
With a sluggish economy, the Great Depression in train and economic nationalism on the
rise, two possible paths to economic development were on the table at the time of the 1932 Irish
general election, namely, free trade or protectionism. With the protectionist platform winning
the day, the new government embarked on a path that continued in force for almost two and a
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half decades, underpinned by the party advocating protectionism winning five successive general
elections and remaining in power for almost two decades (see Figure 2 below).
Antecedent Conditions
Sluggish economy
Great Depression denting appeal of free trade policy
Economic nationalism
Critical Juncture
1932 General Election – party advocating protectionism (Fianna Fáil)
defeated party advocating continuing free trade (Cumann na nGael)
Structural Persistence (1932-1948)
Fianna Fáil held power for 16 years (5 successive general elections)
Building and bolstering protectionist institutions – legislation and supporting organizations
Appeals to economic nationalism
Economic War with Great Britain
Reactive Sequence (1948-1958)
Inefficiency of protectionism
Saturated domestic market
Migration from land
Increasing unemployment
Increasing emigration
Deteriorating balance of payments

Maintain protection, but more expansive/
proactive industrial policy:
-New organizations (IDA, CTT, AFT)
-Fiscal and capital incentives
-Promote indigenous industrial development
-Promote exports / FDI

Plus, moves internationally dismantling protectionism in favor of free trade, ie, GATT, ECSC, EEC

Emergence and early path of IDA (Figure 3)

Figure 2: The protectionist path, 1932-1958.
As it was, the party in government invested significant political capital in protectionism
as the means to achieving economic independence, appealing to economic nationalism and
engaging in an economic war with the UK. Additionally, the government set about building the
protectionist machine through passing legislation and establishing appropriate organizations.
Through layering (Thelen, 2003), legislation and supporting organizations were added to
partially re-negotiate elements of the machine, while at the same time strengthening it in the
process. These various legislative moves also exhibit learning effects, as can be seen in the
adaptations made to various pieces of legislation constituting the machine. The investment in
these legislative and organizational assets, which were specific to protectionism, added to the
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resilience of the institution and deepened the equilibrium established by the turn to selfsufficiency. Further, coordination effects and adaptive expectations were evident in the support
for this infrastructure, not just by government, but also by industrialists.
By the late 1940s, protectionism was coming under pressure because of its inefficiency,
the saturated domestic market, migration from the land, increasing unemployment and
emigration, and a deteriorating balance of payments.

While continuing with the policy of

protectionism, a new government sought to combat its ills through engaging a more proactive
industrial policy centered in a new organization, the Industrial Development Authority (IDA). In
establishing the IDA in 1949, the government chose between establishing an autonomous body
and the existing civil service arrangements, opting for the former and investing in a path to bring
about its creation (see Figure 3 below). That path involved high set-up costs, not to mention
adaptive expectations, entailing negotiating the proposal within government and the civil service
and then selling the idea to the media, to industrialists, to members of the coalition parties and to
party faithful. It entailed recruiting the Authority members and establishing the Authority as an
administrative body in advance of any legislation passing through the Oireachtas1, itself a large
investment should the initiative have failed in its passage through the legislative process at any
of the formal veto points. It entailed drafting legislation and steering passage of same through
the legislative process, with succeeding stages dependent on passage of preceding stages first.
Indeed, in bringing a Bill to the Oireachtas, government had to be sure that it would have the
support of its own members to ensure safe passage, whatever about the position taken by the
opposition.
Thus, even before coming to the Oireachtas, there were already significant start-up costs
and expectations as to what the Authority would achieve. Such was the investment that, on
1

Legislature, which comprises the Dáil (lower house of parliament) and the Seanad (senate).
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returning to power in 1951 once again, rather than abolish the Authority as it had threatened to
do, the party that had built protectionism refocused the IDA instead on industrial development,
taking away the administrative role that was properly seen to rest with civil servants and freeing
the Authority to focus on promoting industrial development. Following this critical juncture, the
Authority had become established as part of the nascent industrial development institutional
landscape.
Protectionism reactive sequence (Figure 2)

Antecedent Conditions
Inefficiency of protectionism; Migration from land; Increasing
unemployment; Increasing emigration; Deteriorating balance of payments
Critical Juncture
Newly elected Inter-Party Government chose a new organization, the IDA, over the
Department of Industry and Commerce to further industrial development
Structural Persistence (1949-1950)
Investment in proposal development, positioning and communication of proposal to party
members, media, industrialists, public
Recruitment of Authority members and establishment of IDA as administrative body
Drafting and passage of legislation through Oireachtas
Reactive Sequence (1950-1951)
IDA became autonomous, self-governing,
statutory body on passage of legislation
through all stages, with amendments to
assuage industrialists and protect Authority
members from threat of abolition

Fianna Fail declared it would be abolished
when they returned to power
Industrialists opposed judicial powers to be
granted IDA
Insufficient resources for IDA to do its job

Outcome – Critical Juncture (1951)
Fianna Fáil returned to power. Kept IDA with narrower focus (promote creation of new
industry). Returned all other functions to Department of Industry and Commerce.
Structural Persistence (1951-1958)
IDA focused on new industry. Engaged in building its legitimacy, credibility and influence.
Came around to view that export-led industrialization and FDI needed. Began actively
promoting FDI. Given grant-making power.

Figure 3: The IDA’s early path.
The IDA represented layering, in the sense that the protectionist institutional matrix was
left in place, and this layer, while an attempt to improve matters, represented learning effects and
further investment, by way of coordination effects and adaptive expectations, in making
protectionism work. Thus, from 1932, there was built an interdependent institutional matrix in

14

support of protectionism, resulting in quite substantial complementarities, with institutional
arrangements mutually reinforcing each other. In essence, institutional arrangements constituted
a stable equilibrium, its resilience being such that institutional continuity conditioned change and
exhibited strong tendencies towards only incremental adjustment (Pierson, 2004).
A critical feature of path dependent processes is the relative ‘openness’ or
‘permissiveness’ of early stages in a sequence compared with the relatively ‘closed’ or ‘coercive’
nature of later stages (Abbott, 1997; Mahoney, 2001). This can be seen in the sequence that
emerged in reaction to protectionism, where new conditions were overwhelming the specific
mechanisms that previously reproduced the protectionist path.

Tentative moves were being

made towards an outward-looking orientation, albeit not in any concerted or coordinated fashion
at the outset and from within the definite confines of protectionism. Initially, the IDA favored
protectionism to encourage indigenous industrial development. However, through experience on
the ground, the Authority’s view gradually changed to seeing export-led industrialization as the
only way to develop the Irish economy and foreign investment as a source for such
industrialization, resulting in its recommendation that the restrictions on foreign capital be eased
(Walsh, 1983, cited in Girvin, 1989: 180-181). The government, in extending the remit of the
IDA, began to actively encourage foreign investment to fill gaps where indigenous industry had
failed to seize opportunities. Subsequently, further modifications were made to facilitate foreign
investment, with industrial policy moving from a focus on import-substitution and indigenous
industry to encouraging exports and foreign investment. Thus, reflective of learning effects,
coordination effects and adaptive expectations, we see a growing shift in policy, itself requiring
the investment of political capital in articulating, supporting and institutionalizing that shift.

15

Following North (1990: 98-99), therefore, the continuity of protectionism was not
inevitable given that the mechanisms of reproduction were subsequently eroded over the course
of the reactive sequence that paved the way for the emergence of a new equilibrium. As we see,
throughout the late 1940s and the 1950s, the decreasing returns to the protectionist path, when
combined with the effects of population movement, began to erode the mechanisms of
reproduction that generated its continuity. While government sought to bolster protectionism
with mechanisms that included new state organizations and incentives to promote industrial
development, this was insufficient to address the decreasing returns.

Of interest is that

institutional responses in support of protectionism, to include the nascent IDA, proved plastic
enough to fit with an outward-looking reactive sequence and institutional matrix developing in
parallel, a sequence driven by the need to deal with new conditions, which included increasing
moves towards free trade and mobile investment capital internationally.
Changing Policy: From Protectionism to Free Trade
As has already been seen, the rules of the game were changing through the 1950s and the
government was becoming more frustrated with protectionism in the face of increasing
inefficiencies.

Despite efforts at actively encouraging industrial development and the

development of exports, the inefficiencies of the protectionist path were proving immune to such
incremental change. It was only with the government’s Programme for Economic Expansion
(1958) that all of these moves were pulled together into a coherent policy of outward-looking
economic development, underpinned by industrial development that embraced export-oriented,
foreign direct investment (FDI).

In marking a critical juncture, this program represented a

significant, path-shifting investment on the part of government in a highly visible policy that
effectively sounded the death knell for protectionism (see Figure 4 below).
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Reactive Sequence (1948-1958)
Inefficiency of protectionism
Saturated domestic market
Migration from land
Increasing unemployment
Increasing emigration
Deteriorating balance of payments

Maintain protection, but more expansive/
proactive industrial policy:
-New organizations (IDA, CTT, AFT)
-Fiscal and capital incentives
-Promote indigenous industrial development
-Promote exports / FDI

Plus, moves internationally dismantling protectionism in favor of free trade, ie, GATT, ECSC, EEC
Outcome – Critical Juncture (1958)
Programme for Economic Expansion – presented a coherent policy of outward-looking economic
development, underpinned by industrial development that embraced export-oriented FDI
Structural Persistence (1958 to present)
Significant investment (political, legislative, organizational, financial) in establishing outwardlooking/export-oriented development, with learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive
expectations sustaining policy reproduction

Figure 4: Reorienting the path from protectionism to outward-looking economic development
Essentially, the move towards a more outward-looking economic development policy
entailed considerable start-up costs, particularly political and particularly for the party in
government, which had preached protectionism for three decades. Representing a fundamental
shift in policy, government had to both divest itself of protectionism and embrace a more open
policy that included accepting foreign investment as a vehicle through which to achieve both
industrial and economic development. Further, it meant government investing in promoting this
highly visible policy change, investing in the creation of new meaning around the new policy and
investing in its implementation.

It meant considerable start-up costs for the civil service in

reorienting itself away from managing protectionism to putting in place new institutions to
manage a more open economy. It also meant investing in engagement with ongoing moves
internationally towards freer trade and the changes such engagement would require, such as the
development of complementary policies, the negotiation and signing of treaties, and the
implementation of these treaties. Further, it meant investment in the development, promotion
and implementation of successor economic development plans that built on, and so reinforced,
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the path established by the critical juncture. Equally, these investments were not just monetary,
but they were also in reorienting the collective mindset, disengaging it from the policy of the past
and engaging it with the policy of the future.
From a policy learning perspective (Pierson, 1993), Ireland’s story of economic
development is illustrative of policy constituting “important rules of the game, influencing the
allocation of economic and political resources, modifying the costs and benefits associated with
alternative…strategies, and consequently altering ensuing” development (Pierson, 1993: 596).
While government shaped the outward-looking economic development policy, following Pierson
(1993), this policy can be seen to have subsequently produced politics, with the policy serving to
shape politics.

This being so, economic development policy can be seen to have produced

resources and incentives (e.g., the IDA, the need to create jobs) for government, with positive
feedback (e.g., jobs created) influencing continued investment in the policy.

Such policy

feedback facilitated the expansion in scope and scale of economic development, with economic
development policy shaping industrial development policy, which, in turn, shaped later
developments and served to reinforce the path taken.
The government’s main objective in terms of industrial policy was to create the
conditions necessary for private enterprise to drive industrial development. Thus, in terms of
adaptive expectations, we see it explicitly expressed as part of government policy that protection
is increasingly untenable in a world that is sensed to be moving towards free trade and in
opposition to an industrial development policy that both welcomes foreign participation and is
export-oriented.

This new approach to economic development established the path to be

followed and, it is in line with this critical juncture, that moves along the path of export-led
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industrialization and economic cooperation with Europe were subsequently made. It was within
this context that the IDA was reproduced.
From Minor Statutory Body to Major State-Sponsored Agency: Building the IDA
The policy change favoring free trade also marked a critical juncture for the IDA (see
Figure 5 below) in focusing its efforts and positioning it as the focal organization in attracting
FDI, effectively turning it into an investment promotion agency, with coordination effects and
adaptive expectations seeing increases in the organization’s scope and resources through the
success of its efforts.

In the years immediately following, the IDA invested in marketing

campaigns and opened offices in the US and Europe, which garnered foreign investment for the
country, such investment garnering further funding for the IDA to facilitate its work, each move
reinforcing further moves along the burgeoning path of FDI as a means of achieving industrial
development.

In terms of complimentary institutional developments, besides the financial

incentives machinery, other legislative moves complemented and facilitated the IDA’s work,
particularly in the area of taxation. Through the 1950s and 1960s, the IDA gradually built the
country’s reputation as a base for manufacturing industry and its reputation and identity as the
country’s industrial development organization.

This period acted as the “pilot stage” in

attracting new industries to the country, albeit the pilot provided much of the manufacturing
sector’s diversification and growth (O’Neill, 1972: 44).
The Authority’s success met with operational limitations, however. As matters stood, the
Authority operated within the tight constraints of the civil service bureaucracy, with no control
over the assignment or withdrawal of its staff, nor over its structure. On the one hand, the IDA
was being asked to play an increasingly demanding, key role in the country’s economic
development, while being handicapped on the other through not having the operational
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autonomy to deliver on that role. To bring about change, the Authority engaged US consultants
Arthur D. Little (1967a, b) to assist it in a major reappraisal of the state’s industrial development
apparatus. The review concluded that achieving full employment rested on encouraging foreign
firms to establish operations in the country, requiring more than just charging the IDA with the
undertaking; the IDA would also need far greater resources than were given it, in addition to the
capacity and flexibility to control its own operations.
Critical Juncture – Economic/Industrial Development Policy (Figure 4)

Critical Juncture (1958)
Programme for Economic Expansion focused IDA exclusively on promoting/attracting FDI, effectively
turning it into an investment promotion agency
Structural Persistence (1958-1966)
Investment in IDA through development program policy statements, provision of resources
Learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations yielded increasing investment by way of
financial resources, legislation, FDI investors, jobs, etc.
Reactive Sequence (1966-1969)
IDA and An Foras Tionscail worked as
separate bodies with limited autonomy
IDA promoted FDI and AFT disbursed
industrial development grants to indigenous
and overseas companies

Reviews by Little (1967a), NIEC (1968)
and PSORG (1969) called for streamlining
industrial development agencies through
creation of state-sponsored superagency
with its own operational autonomy

Outcome – Critical Juncture (1969/70)
Government accepted the review recommendations and drafted the necessary legislation, which was
passed by the Oireachtas as the Industrial Development Act, 1969
The new IDA came into being on April 1st, 1970
Structural Persistence (1970-1982)
High fixed set-up costs in establishing the ‘new’ IDA as a state-sponsored superagency – legislation,
political capital, staff recruitment, financial resources, etc.
Learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations yielded increasing investment by
way of financial resources, legislation, marketing programs, industrial investors, jobs, internal
reorganizations, etc.

Figure 5 – IDA path from minor statutory body to major state-sponsored super-agency.
On foot of the Little (1967a, b), the National Industrial Economic Council (1968) and the
Public Services Organisation Review Group (1969) reviews, and by way of critical juncture, new
legislation, enacted in 1969, streamlined agencies dealing with industrial development and
concentrated the expertise within an expanded IDA having full control over its own internal
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operations.

It gave the Authority the status of a state-sponsored organization having national

responsibility for the furtherance of industrial development, in addition to consolidating
decision-making power concerning industrial development within the Authority. Government
maintained overall control through its power to appoint the Authority’s members, its broad
responsibility for setting industrial policy and its broad control over the Authority’s budget.
Additionally, government pro-actively legitimized the Authority’s role and position, making it
clear through the reorganization legislation that both industrial development and the IDA’s
central role in it represented a vital, long-term program for Ireland to which it was committed.
Having invested considerable set-up costs in re-creating the IDA, in terms of, for
example, consultants reports, political capital, legislation and dissolution of agencies, the new
IDA came into being as a state-sponsored body on April 1st, 1970. From enactment of the
establishing legislation there followed considerable investment in a highly specific asset, namely
an autonomous industrial development organization, which entailed physical specificity (e.g., the
IDA as an industrial development organization, industrial development legislation, policies and
programs, party political platforms on industrial development, all of which involved design
characteristics particular to industrial development), human specificity (e.g., the IDA’s
specialized knowledge of the industrial development environment resulting from learning-bydoing, and its special relationships with various actors resulting from repeated interactions with
these actors) and dedicated assets, where the value of all assets derived from continuance of
industrial development to which they were applied (Pierson, 2004).
Now vested with the formulation and implementation of national and regional industrial
policy and freed from the shackles of the civil service to manage its own affairs, the Authority
put in place systems, structures and institutional arrangements that have persisted over time. Re-
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creating the IDA entailed introducing a new organization structure and meeting its expanded
mandate saw the organization engage in a major recruitment drive.

In seeing industrial

development as a ‘cooperative process’, requiring the participation of a range of development
organizations, the IDA from early on saw value in building contacts throughout the country and
devoted significant staff resources to managing them through representations of key personnel on
a range of main boards, committees and organizations. The new IDA also decided to carry out
many of its executive functions through committees, with delegated grant giving powers, on
which other interests participated, e.g., the Confederation of Irish Industry, the Irish Export
Board, research institutes, universities and government departments.
The new IDA also invested in creating a Janus-faced organization, with one face
managing the needs of and relationship with industry and the other face managing the needs of
and relationship with government, very much placing the IDA itself in the position of a
coordinating mechanism, the benefits of its activities being enhanced through coordinating with
the activities of both government and industrial investors.
Having the ear of government, the IDA was active in generating further
complementarities with other policy areas, such as education and physical infrastructure. As the
increasingly credible experts, the IDA was in the unique position of being able to say to
government what was needed to facilitate and encourage industrial development and the delivery
of new jobs, such that government listened and acted accordingly. Arguably, the IDA was able
to use its position to generate increasing complementarities thereby increasing its value and
reinforcing its own stability.
Building on the experience gained since promotional activity commenced in 1955, the
new IDA adopted a more intensive and focused method of promotion encompassing a more
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selective approach, direct marketing, advertising and public relations. For the IDA, this researchbased promotional program proved an effective tool in targeting its limited resources at foreign
companies that were looking to expand abroad and that met Ireland’s industrial development
needs (IDA Annual Report, 1971/72: 20).
In effect, and revealing learning effects and adaptive expectations in refining a strategy it
had pursued since the 1960s, the IDA went about attracting leading companies in the field, a
strategy that contributed to increasing returns in the spatial location of production (Arthur, 1994;
Krugman, 1991).

These companies, in turn, attracted suppliers, skilled labor, specialized

services and appropriate infrastructure, and contributed to the development of social networks,
which facilitated the exchange of information and expertise.

Further, the presence of these

companies and the concentration of these factors contributed to Ireland’s attractiveness for other
firms in the sector, in effect, acting like magnets and influencing the locational decisions and
investments of these other companies.
Thus, working from within the constrained choice-set presented by the chosen path to
achieving industrial development, namely the active sourcing of foreign investment to create
sustainable jobs (McLoughlin, 1972: 35), the IDA, on the back of a strong planning process and
cognizant of its limited resources, prioritized industrial sectors and targeted leading companies
that the organization expected would deliver a high national economic and social benefit into the
future. In essence, and building on the learning gained from its earlier promotional efforts in
using leading companies to attract others, adaptive expectations came into play in adopting this
selective, targeted approach, with success over time reinforcing the approach such that it became
self-fulfilling. That is, the approach delivered investment and jobs, which reinforced continued
investment in the approach, which delivered further investment and jobs as agglomeration effects

23

came into play, with the winning companies attracting investment from others in the sector, this
positive feedback itself reinforcing the value of the IDA as an industrial development
organization, especially when set against the poor performance of indigenous industry.
By way of delivering results for government, and also by way of focusing the
organization on its mandate, the Authority instituted a highly quantified approach new to state
agencies at the time, namely annual targets for the creation of jobs, which were made public in
advance and subsequently reported on so that the organization could be seen to be performing in
delivering results (MacSharry & White, 2000: 194). Such highly visible performance measures
served to reinforce the chosen path to industrial development, with achievement of targets being
evidence to government and the public that the IDA were delivering results, which encouraged
continued investment in the IDA, in turn delivering on targets and so on.

Such were the

coordination effects afforded by the IDA in terms of job creation that, in tandem with learning
effects and adaptive expectations, the organization’s requests for exchequer funding, for both
incentives and administration, were invariably looked upon favorably.
In terms of program development (e.g., Re-equipment and Modernization, Product and
Process Development, Service Industries, Project Identification, Enterprise Development), its
programs are illustrative of the learning-by-doing that occurred over time and that served to
consolidate the IDA’s position as the national industrial development organization.

All are

indicative of its capacity to learn and to innovate, in the process ensuring its continued relevance
as the focal point in coordinating industrial development policy formulation and implementation.
Effectively, over time, the IDA developed programs suited to the particular industrial
development challenges it faced, illustrating that a significant amount of learning-by-doing had
occurred in the increasingly complex industrial development system.
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While the 1950s and 1960s were about building and consolidating the Authority’s
identity, credibility and legitimacy, following the critical juncture that created the ‘new’ IDA
super-agency, the 1970s was a period of building the organizational form and further
consolidating the IDA’s credibility and legitimacy. The decade was capped by a progress report
(IDA Annual Report, 1979: 3-4) citing a litany of achievements, including an expanded,
autonomous organization employing almost 700 highly skilled staff, client company investment
of £2.7bn (compared to £130m in the 1960s) for a total grant commitment of £831m and job
approvals of 192,000 (compared to 45,500 for the 1960s), with 99,000 in domestic industry. To
all intents and purposes, it appeared as though the significant investment of resources in the IDA,
allied with its own learning and the increased coordination of policies and activities to fit with its
interests, was delivering according to expectations, this positive feedback reinforcing the IDA as
an organizational form. However, from the relative glory of the 1970s, the IDA moved to more
challenging times in the 1980s.
Back to the Future: From State-Sponsored Super-Agency to Agency Focused on FDI
From a path dependence perspective, the story moves from one of structural persistence
to a reactive sequence that culminates in a critical juncture leading to the reorganization of the
IDA.

According to Wickham (1983), Ireland’s success in attracting FDI lay in the very

particular situation of the IDA. As has already been noted, the organization was effectively the
sole industrial development body in the country; it had, to this point, remained unchallenged by
any power center either in the country or outside it; it was shielded from political interference
that would have impacted both policy formulation and implementation; its “discretionary”
decision-making was suited to dealing with private enterprise; and it was in a position to
legitimate itself to all stakeholders as fulfilling an important national task.
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While Wickham’s observation points to success with foreign investment, the same
success was not achieved with domestic industry. Having experienced a decade of relative glory
through the 1970s, the organization’s legitimacy came into question on foot of the Telesis (1982)
review and at a time when the country was experiencing the effects of a global recession, a poor
foreign

investment

climate,

mounting

domestic

economic

problems

and

increasing

unemployment (IDA Annual Reports, 1980-83; MacSharry & White, 2000; Telesis, 1982).
While reliance on foreign investment had found general acceptance and largely went
unquestioned, concerns nonetheless gradually emerged throughout the 1970s about an overreliance on such investment and its tenuous links with the economy, not to mention a dualistic
industrial structure and the influence of external interests on national sovereignty (e.g., Cooper &
Whelan, 1973; Economist, 1977; Jacobsen, 1978; Kennedy & Dowling, 1975; Long, 1976).
These concerns led the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) to commission a five-part
review to ensure that government industrial policy was suited to creating an internationally
competitive industrial base in Ireland.
One of the reviews, Telesis (1982), had the greatest impact of all in regard to the IDA and
to industrial development policy. In assessing the state’s then industrial policy, Telesis was
complimentary on number of fronts. It considered that the country had a clearly articulated, very
advanced, extensive and consistent industrial policy, with inventive and energetic state agencies
devising programs to deliver on policy goals. With particular reference to the IDA, the review
observed that it had succeeded in developing what was arguably the most dynamic, active,
efficient and effective organization of its kind in the world, with a well-earned reputation as the
leading organization in the field.

26

However, the review also noted weaknesses in industrial policy had contributed to
weaknesses in the country’s industrial structure, thus limiting the success of the country’s
industrial development. The review’s main criticism was that industrial development had largely
depended on FDI, while indigenous industry languished. It criticized the practice of creating and
counting job approvals over the creation and counting of actual jobs delivered, commenting that,
while there was value politically to government and motivationally to the IDA in touting job
approval targets, the gap between approval and reality had the effect of creating expectations in
the general population that were then not met. And from a governance perspective, it noted that,
legally, government departments were responsible for determining strategy with the IDA and
other development agencies responsible for strategy implementation, whereas the reality was that
the IDA formulated strategy in line with its job creation mandate, while government departments
were both lacking in staff numbers and information sufficient to formulate strategy and oversee
the implementation of this strategy by the relevant agencies.
The overall impact of Telesis was to refine both the IDA and industrial development
policy. Changes were bounded and incremental, with the IDA still very much the lead industrial
development organization. The outcome of Telesis and the debate it engendered was the setting
of an adjusted course, building on past success and reflecting the lessons learned from
experience gained to that point. In many respects, given the complexity of the problems it
confronted, i.e., a worsening fiscal crisis and increasing unemployment, government relied
heavily on the pre-existing industrial development policy and organizational framework,
adjusting at the margins to accommodate the demands of the situation (Pierson, 1993). The
above tallies with Hall’s (1989: 11) proposition that ‘prior experience with related policies’ is
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such that ‘states will be predisposed towards policies with which they already have some
favourable experience.’
While the exogenous shocks of the early 1980s engendered an industrial policy debate,
the result was on-path responses entailing layering onto the existing industrial development
institution. The IDA remained the focal organization, foreign investment remained an important
source for jobs and greater attention was now to be paid to indigenous industry, with the IDA
and government coalescing around this on-path response through their collective effort at
articulating an industrial development policy that validated the approach taken over the
preceding decades and that acknowledged the learning accruing that facilitated incremental
change. It was not a case that the IDA had not been doing anything with indigenous industry;
rather collective learning suggested it needed to invest more into what it was already doing.
With Telesis still very much in the background, the late 1980s witnessed a number of
threats to the IDA in terms of its position as the central industrial development organization
(MacSharry & White, 2000: 212), while the early 1990s witnessed yet another review of
industrial policy with major ramifications for the IDA (Employment Through Enterprise, 1993;
Industrial Policy Review Group, 1992). Representing another critical juncture, the outcome of
the review saw the Department of Industry and Commerce reclaim the role of determining
industrial policy and of supervising its implementation from the IDA, which was split into three
separate organizations.
Thus it was that the policy refocus recommended from Telesis onwards found subsequent
expression in the formal recreation of the IDA as three separate, autonomous bodies in January,
1994, each with its own board and its own distinct mission and goals. All three agencies operate
within a framework which facilitates cooperation and mutual support, with Forfás, the umbrella
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agency, focusing on policy, Forbairt (now Enterprise Ireland) charged with promoting
indigenous industry and IDA-Ireland responsible for attracting FDI to Ireland.
From the relative success of the 1970s, the IDA entered the 1980s under a cloud created
by the Telesis (1982) review, which was exacerbated by the poor economic and jobs climate
throughout the decade. The structural persistence that marked the 1970s gave way to a reactive
sequence that saw both questioning of the IDA and self-reinforcing mechanisms generating
increasing returns to continuing with the IDA, finding subsequent expression in the critical
juncture that brought about recreation of the IDA (see Figure 6 below).
Outcome – Critical Juncture (1969/70)
Government accepted the review recommendations and drafted the necessary legislation, which was passed
by the Oireachtas as the Industrial Development Act, 1969
The ‘new’ IDA came into being on April 1st, 1970
Structural Persistence (1970-1982)
High fixed set-up costs in establishing the ‘new’ IDA as a semi-state superagency – legislation, political
capital, staff recruitment, financial resources, etc.
Learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations yielded increasing investment by way of
financial resources, legislation, marketing programs, industrial investors, jobs, internal reorganizations, etc.
Reactive Sequence (1982-1993)
IDA maintained its position as the
pivotal industrial development
organization
IDA responded with a complete policy
re-think and restructured to address
weaknesses
Government White Paper on Industrial
policy (1984) reaffirmed IDA role and
position and emphasized more
selective approach to industrial
development
IDA, major Government party,
Department of Finance and opposition
parties against splitting IDA

Poor economic climate throughout 1980s
Telesis (1982) review questions IDA performance and
industrial policy
Media castigate IDA performance
Triennial review empowers SFADCo at expense of
IDA in mid-West region
Questioning re-emerges with IPRG review and its
recommendation to split IDA into separate indigenous
and oversaes organizations
Minister and Department of Enterprise and
Employment and minor Government party accepted
IPRG recommendation
Moriarty implemented IDA restructuring into 3
separate agencies

Outcome – Critical Juncture (1993/94)
Government drafted legislation to split the IDA into 3 separate organizations, which was passed by the
Oireachtas as the Industrial Development Act, 1993
Forfás, Forbairt and IDA-Ireland came into being on January 1st, 1994

Figure 6: IDA path from industrial development super-agency to agency focused on FDI.
From a path dependence perspective, arguably, the change to the IDA as an industrial
development organization remains within the bounds of the path being pursued since the critical
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juncture of the 1950s. What has transpired in the interim is that much policy learning and
organizational learning has ensued, such that the state continued to invest in refining its
industrial development policy and the institutional and organizational arrangements established
in support of that policy. The IDA of 1955 has continued on through to the IDA-Ireland of
today, in terms of its sole focus on promoting internationally mobile investment by foreign
interests in Ireland, albeit losing its ‘authority’ in the process2. The IDA that emerged from the
late 1960s incorporating indigenous along with foreign industry was subsequently renegotiated
in the early 1990s, such that the organizational structure that existed internally was externalized
through the creation of separate agencies out of the existing divisional structure.
Today, IDA-Ireland (2008) points to over 1,000 foreign companies operating in Ireland,
representing direct employment of 135,000 and accounting for 25 per cent of GDP and over 80
per cent of exports. The organization boasts of an ICT sector of over 220 foreign companies,
with five of the world’s top ten having a substantial base in the country, with some 40,000
employed in the sector, and accounts for over €50 billion in exports. In the pharmaceutical
sector, the 83 facilities employ some 17,000 people directly, thirteen of the top fifteen companies
in the world have significant operations in the country, six of the top ten (and 12 of the top 25)
selling drugs in the world are produced in the country making Ireland one of the world’s largest
exporters of pharmaceuticals, with exports topping €30 billion.

The 130 companies in the

medical technologies sector, 15 of which are in the world’s top 25, employ over 26,000 and
achieve annual, largely export, sales in excess of €6 billion, such that this sector is comparable in
scale to the largest clusters globally in Minnesota and Massachusetts. The organization is also

2

Personal interview with Padraic White on May 9th, 2006. Mr. White joined the IDA in 1969 and rose to become
Managing Director in 1981, serving in that position until 1990.
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active in attracting and retaining FDI in the international financial services, engineering,
international services, consumer products, chemicals and biometrics sectors.
IN CONCLUSION… A PATH DEPENDENCE PICTURE OF
ORGANIZATIONAL FORM(ING)
Thus, taking all of the above together, what emerges is a path dependence picture of the
IDA’s creation within the context of a protectionist path, and subsequent production and
reproduction within the context of a free trade path. We see the critical junctures marking the
turn to protectionism and then to free trade, in addition to the critical junctures marking the
IDA’s establishment, then its focus on development of new industry and re-focus on FDI,
followed by its re-creation as a super-agency with national responsibility for all aspects of
industrial development policy and implementation, and most recently its re-focus on FDI, with
its responsibility for policy development and indigenous industry centered in separate, new
agencies.
Post-critical junctures, positive feedback mechanisms come into play to produce and
reproduce structural persistence. We see large set-up costs and ongoing investment, initially in
protectionism and subsequently in a policy geared towards free trade, e.g., policy statements,
policy documents, legislation, new institutions and organizations, ongoing commitment of
resources (financial, political, legislative), etc. We see the knowledge gained in the operation of
both policy regimes contributing to positive feedback in their continued use, such feedback
incurring continued investment aimed at greater efficiency and effectiveness, for example, in the
fine-tuning of legislation and the establishment of complementary organizations. Increased use
of each policy regime encouraged investment in linked and complementary activities, in turn
making each regime more attractive. And adaptive expectations drove continued investment in
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both policy regimes to reduce uncertainties, whereby the greater the expectation that policy
would continue in force the greater actions would be adapted to realize those expectations. The
self-fulfilling character of expectations contributed to the policy winning broader acceptance and
increased the dynamic of coordination effects.
We also see such large set-up costs and investment going into the IDA, producing and
reproducing an increasingly specific industrial development asset.

Tremendous amounts of

learning by doing has occurred in what has increasingly become a complex system, with the IDA
developing strategies suited to the particular institutional matrix it has confronted.

We see

widespread coordination effects, with particular courses of action encouraged, and others
discouraged, given the anticipated actions of others within the industrial development sphere.
We see growing complementarity between the outward-looking policy of economic development
and the IDA as the increasingly focal organization delivering on the country’s industrial
development.

Coevolving over an extended period of time, the interactions between the two

have created densely linked institutional matrices (North, 1990).
However, we also see that paths have not continued indefinitely, as was the case with
protectionism and with the IDA itself. A reactive sequence emerged in response to the growing
disquiet with protectionism, which culminated in the outcome or critical juncture that saw the
outward-looking economic development policy take its place. The initial fortunes of the IDA
played out within this reactive sequence. Its establishment attracted the threat of abolition by the
opposition and it became bogged down in managing protectionism to the detriment of promoting
industrial development. However, the outcome or critical juncture was favorable to the IDA in
setting it on its path as an industrial development organization through removing it of its
bureaucratic burden administering the protectionist machine. The critical juncture that saw the
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organization’s role re-focused to attract FDI was influenced by the reactive sequence at the
broader level of economic policy. The subsequent reactive sequence that resulted in the recreation of the IDA as a semi-state super-agency was a response to the perceived and real
inefficiencies of having multiple state agencies dealing with industrial investment and doing so
from within the operational confines of the civil service. And the reactive sequence that began
with the Telesis review and culminated in the re-creation of the IDA as three separate agencies
reflected ongoing debate over the needs of foreign and indigenous investors, the scope of
industrial policy and the division and location of policy development and policy implementation
responsibility.
In the final analysis, from relatively contingent and unpredictable beginnings have
coevolved both an institution and an organizational form. In the case of the IDA, both the forces
for structural persistence and those of reactive sequences have contributed to producing and
reproducing an increasingly fine-tuned, specific asset, an organizational form that, ex ante, could
not have been predicted when it was first established. In other words, telling the story of the
IDA from a path dependence perspective allows for engagement with history and process, in so
doing maintaining an opening toward organizational forming in organizational theorizing and
research.
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